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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 John Johnson appeals his judgment of conviction and 
sentence following a jury trial.  Although he raises four 
assignments of error, Johnson‘s most significant claim is that the 
District Court‘s individual voir dire procedure violated his 
constitutional rights and the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure.  Because we are persuaded by neither Johnson‘s 
principal argument nor his ancillary claims, we will affirm the 
judgment and sentence of the District Court. 
I 
 On February 3, 2007, police officers from Cheltenham 
Township, Pennsylvania, enlisted a confidential informant to 
arrange a controlled purchase of cocaine from his usual supplier, 
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who was later identified as John Johnson.  That evening, Officer 
Tom Fahy and the confidential informant purchased a bag of 
cocaine from Johnson in the parking lot of a Home Depot.  Six 
days later, the informant arranged a controlled purchase in 
Philadelphia, where officers arrested Johnson as he approached 
the informant‘s car.  A search of Johnson‘s person yielded $200, 
a loaded semi-automatic handgun, two bags of white powder, 
and a cell phone associated with the phone number that the 
informant had called to arrange the buys.  Laboratory testing 
later confirmed that the substances recovered during both buys 
amounted to 8.76 grams of cocaine. 
 Johnson was tried before a jury and convicted of cocaine 
distribution and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (Counts One 
and Two), using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking 
offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count Three), and 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (Count Four).  Johnson was later sentenced 
to 120 months‘ imprisonment, six years of supervised release, a 
$1000 fine, and a $400 special assessment. 
 Johnson raises four issues on appeal, claiming: (1) the 
District Court violated his constitutional rights and Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 43 by questioning prospective jurors at 
sidebar outside his presence, (2) the Court abused its discretion 
in denying his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential 
informant, (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction on Count Three, and (4) the Court erred by imposing 
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 During jury selection, the District Court followed the 
customary procedure of questioning prospective jurors first in 
open court and later individually at sidebar.  Johnson remained 
at the defense table during the sidebar proceedings, which were 
on the record.  The District Court ruled on challenges for cause 
at sidebar, and thereafter counsel returned to their tables to mark 
their peremptory challenges. 
 Johnson argues that this procedure violated his 
constitutional right to be present at all stages of his trial.  But 
neither Johnson nor his counsel objected to the procedure during 
jury selection, even when prompted to do so by the District 
Court.  The decision not to object to voir dire conducted at 
sidebar and outside the presence of the defendant is a tactical 
decision similar to the one at issue in Gonzalez v. United States, 
553 U.S. 242 (2008).  In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court held that 
―express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate 
judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial.‖  Id. at 250. 
 Noting that ―acceptance of a magistrate judge at the jury 
selection phase is a tactical decision that is well suited for the 
attorney‘s own decision,‖ the Court explained that 
[a] magistrate judge‘s or a district judge‘s 
particular approach to voir dire both in 
substance—the questions asked—and in tone—
                                                 
1
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
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formal or informal—may be relevant in light of 
the attorney‘s own approach.  The attorney may 
decide whether to accept the magistrate judge 
based in part on these factors.  As with other 
tactical decisions, requiring personal, on-the-
record approval from the client could necessitate a 
lengthy explanation the client might not 
understand at the moment and that might distract 
from more pressing matters as the attorney seeks 
to prepare the best defense. 
Id. 
 An attorney‘s obligation to consult with his client ―does 
not require counsel to obtain the defendant‘s consent to ‗every 
tactical decision.‘‖  Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004) 
(quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417–18 (1988)).  As 
with the choice to proceed before a magistrate judge during voir 
dire, the decision to have a criminal defendant present—and in 
close proximity to individual jurors—during individual voir dire 
conducted at sidebar is tactical and does not require the 
defendant‘s express consent.  Like counsel in Gonzalez, 
Johnson‘s lawyer consented to the jury selection procedures and 
thereby waived his client‘s right to challenge them.  See United 
States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 407 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(―Sherwood waived his right to be present [during the attorney-
conducted voir dire at sidebar] by failing to indicate to the 
district court that he wished to be present at side bar.‖); 
Cardinal v. Gorczyk, 81 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1996) (―Cardinal 
waived his Sixth Amendment right to observe the individual 
voir dire by failing to assert that right.‖); see also Nixon, 543 
U.S. at 192 (―When counsel informs the defendant of the 
strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant‘s best interest 
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and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel‘s strategic choice is 
not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant‘s 
explicit consent.‖). 
 Because no objection was made to the jury selection 
process, Johnson‘s claim of a Rule 43 violation is also waived.  
Rule 43 requires that a defendant be present at ―every trial stage, 
including jury impanelment.‖  Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a).  The 
Supreme Court has held that ―failure by a criminal defendant to 
invoke his right to be present under [Rule 43] at a conference 
which he knows is taking place between the judge and a juror in 
chambers constitutes a valid waiver of that right.‖  United States 
v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529 (1985).  ―The district court need 
not get an express ‗on the record‘ waiver from the defendant for 
every trial conference which a defendant may have a right to 
attend. . . . A defendant knowing of such a discussion must 
assert whatever right he may have under Rule 43 to be present.‖ 
 Id. at 528. 
 Likewise, we have found that ―[a] defendant need not be 
warned expressly of his or her rights under Rule 43, nor must a 
waiver exist on the record [because] the simple failure to assert 
the right constitutes a waiver.‖  United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 
1384, 1399 (3d Cir. 1994).  As the Courts of Appeals for the 
First, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have found, we now 
hold that Gagnon applies to voir dire.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Fernandez-Hernandez, 652 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2011) (―The 
court‘s questioning of the prospective jurors outside the 
presence of the Defendant[] was justified, and, in any event, 
[Defendant] waived any right to be present pursuant to Rule 43 
by his failure to object at trial.‖); United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 
1350, 1369 (4th Cir. 1996) (―We agree that the defendants had 
the right to be present during the bench conferences with the 
 7 
 
jurors, but we conclude that the defendants waived their right by 
failing to object before the district court swore in the jury.‖); 
Kilmartin v. Dormire, 161 F.3d 1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(―[Kilmartin‘s] right to attend and to participate in his trial . . . 
was not violated [by his absence from bench conferences with 
jurors because] Kilmartin was not excluded from the courtroom, 
and his counsel was present . . . [and he] voiced neither a desire 
to be present nor an objection to his absence.‖); United States v. 
McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 788–89 (9th Cir. 1986) (―Appellants 
[who] did not object to their exclusion from in-chambers 
conferences at any time in the proceeding . . . waived their right 
to be present at the in-chambers voir dire.‖).  Because Gagnon 
applies to voir dire, Johnson‘s claim that the District Court 
violated Rule 43 fails. 
III 
Johnson raises three additional issues.  As they are 
neither difficult to resolve nor of precedential import, we discuss 
them only briefly. 
A 
Johnson claims the District Court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential 
informant.  ―We review the District Court‘s refusal to order 
disclosure of [a] confidential informant‘s identity for abuse of 
discretion.‖  United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  While such disclosure is required where ―an 
informer‘s identity, or . . . the contents of his communication, is 
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential 
to a fair determination of a cause,‖ Roviaro v. United States, 353 
U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957), the burden to demonstrate the need for 
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disclosure rests on the defendant, United States v. Jiles, 658 
F.2d 194, 197 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 Johnson has failed to meet this burden.  ―The mere 
speculation that an eyewitness may have some evidence helpful 
to defendant‘s case is not sufficient to show the specific need 
required by Roviaro.‖  Id.  Though the confidential informant 
was an eyewitness to the two drug transactions, Johnson‘s 
suggestion that his testimony would support a mistaken-identity 
defense is speculative because Officer Fahy, who was present at 
both buys, positively identified Johnson, as did the officers who 
observed Johnson approach the informant‘s car on February 9, 
2007.  Because Johnson did not meet his burden under Roviaro, 
the District Court was well within its discretion in denying his 
motion. 
B 
 Johnson‘s penultimate argument challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for 
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking 
offense.  When evaluating whether a jury verdict rests on legally 
sufficient evidence, we apply ―a particularly deferential standard 
of review.‖  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
1998); see also United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (―A claim of sufficiency of evidence places a very 
heavy burden on the appellant.‖).  We review evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Government and ―must affirm the 
conviction[] if a rational trier of fact could have found [the] 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and the verdict is 
supported by substantial evidence.‖  Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1243. 
 When evaluating the reasonableness of a jury‘s finding 
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that a defendant possessed a gun in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking offense, we consider 
the type of drug activity that [was] being 
conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of 
the weapon, whether the weapon [was] stolen, the 
status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), 
whether the gun [was] loaded, proximity to drugs 
or drug profits, and the time and circumstances 
under which the gun [was] found. 
United States v. Sparrow, 371 F.3d 851, 853 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Government, we hold that Johnson‘s illegal possession of a 
loaded handgun in his waistband while trafficking drugs 
provided substantial evidence to support the jury‘s conclusion 
that he used the weapon in furtherance of the offense.  See 
Coyle, 63 F.3d at 1243. 
C 
 Finally, Johnson challenges the substantive 
reasonableness of his sentence.  We review this claim for abuse 
of discretion, United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 769 (3d Cir. 
2010), and ―will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular 
defendant for the reasons the district court provided,‖ United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 Johnson‘s Sentencing Guidelines range was 97 to 106 
months, and he received a sentence of 120 months‘ 
imprisonment.  The record demonstrates that the District Court 
carefully reviewed the relevant sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 3553(a).  In doing so, the Court noted that Johnson‘s prior 
sentences did not ―appear to have captured completely the 
seriousness of those offenses or the punishment that the Judges 
in those cases wished to impose upon [him].‖  The failure of 
those shorter sentences to deter Johnson, his unwillingness to 
accept responsibility, and his long history of criminal behavior 
all support the District Court‘s upward variance.  Accordingly, 
we find no abuse of discretion. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court‘s 
judgment of conviction and sentence. 
